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Two Faces of Liberalism
CASS

R. SUNSTEIN*

Richard Epstein's Takings: Private Property and the Power of
Eminent Domain I purports to speak for the liberal tradition of political theory, and the book does indeed represent a strand of liberalism.
Several tenets of the strand of liberalism in Takings stand out: the
existing distribution of wealth is "natural"; politics should not deal
with distributional issues; each person always knows what is in his
own interest; voluntary transactions are necessarily in the best interests of the parties; and the existing set of preferences should not be
subject to democratic processes. But the tradition for which Takings
speaks is a narrow and comparatively recent one. Liberal political
thought also is embodied in approaches that take a critical and selfconscious approach to the current distribution of property and the
current set of preferences.' Under such theories, neither property nor
preferences are taken as inviolate.
Insofar as it is about property, Takings owes its origins to the set
of beliefs associated with the Lochner 3 era, when an aggressive
Supreme Court threatened the regulatory state. The approach of the
Lochner Court foundered on various grounds. These included, above
all, the institutional strain on so aggressive a judiciary-invalidating,
time and again, outcomes of the democratic process-and the controversial character of the Court's assumption that the existing distribution of wealth was natural and not a proper subject of politics.
Takings is vulnerable for the same reasons that led the Supreme Court
to reject Lochner. These critiques have appeared in discussions of
Takings in this Conference and elsewhere. In this commentary, I will
focus not on Epstein's approach to property, but instead on his belief
that government should take private preferences for granted, and his
associated view that private consumption choices are the only appropriate basis for government action.
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Some of the ideas set forth in this Comment
are elaborated in greater detail in Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986).
1. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

(1985) [hereinafter (p. _)].
2. For a modern statement, see S. HOLMES, BENJAMIN CONSTANT AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN LIBERALISM

(1984).

3. So-called after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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AN ALTERNATIVE TRADITION

Epstein's views on the liberal tradition are best reflected in his
adherence to the agency theory of government. He says, for example,
that "[riepresentative government begins with the premise that the
state's rights against its citizens are no greater than the sum of the
rights of the individuals whom it benefits in any given transaction.
The state qua state has no independent set of entitlements, any more
than a corporation has rights qua corporation against any of its shareholders" (p. 331). But this description is highly controversial. It was
not, for example, the theory of representation of the framers. For
James Madison, national representatives were supposed to deliberate
on constituent preferences, not to implement what constituents
"want." Moreover, the notion that governments can do only what
individual actors might prefer is inconsistent with the preferences of
private actors themselves. As we shall see, the concept of "preference" is much more complex than the agency theory of government
acknowledges. Citizens do not want to and need not be treated as
shareholders.
The approach in Takings, treating private preferences as natural
and inviolate, attempts to draw on both of the two principal traditions
in American political and constitutional thought-welfare and
autonomy. But neither tradition supports the premises of Takings.
In some settings, government decisions that attempt to shape preferences will produce significant increases in welfare. Consider statutes
forbidding gambling, or the consumption of addictive substances, or
requiring the use of motorcycle helmets and seatbelts. In all of these
settings, there should be welfare gains from government action, quite
apart from the impact of the conduct in question on third parties.'
Moreover, a familiar conception of autonomy, associated with
Kant, understands the term to refer to selection rather than mere
implementation of preferences. This theme in liberalism understands
the notion of freedom to connote a process in which a person chooses
his own ends and does not merely attempt to satisfy whatever ends he
"has." Under this view, private preferences are, by virtue of their
status as such, entitled only to presumptive respect. The republican
conception of politics generalizes this understanding, treating governance as a collective process in which citizens select ends through
political participation. Takings ignores this aspect of the liberal tradi4. See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
5. Proceedings of the Conference on Takings of Property and the Constitution, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 49, 142-46 (1986).
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tion, which played an important role in the constitutional framing.6
For the framers, freedom consisted in self-governance through politics
as well as in the satisfaction of private preferences. The approach in
Takings disregards this understanding of freedom in the liberal
tradition.
II.

SOME EXAMPLES

Suppose it is agreed that in some circumstances the citizenry,
acting through the government, may make decisions about preferences. There are familiar risks in such a course. Conscious preference-shaping by government may threaten freedom as well as
promote it.' But there are four contexts in which government action,
understood in republican fashion, might diverge from private consumption choices. The point of the discussion that follows is to outline circumstances in which both welfare and freedom may be served
by government action that derives from this alternative species of liberalism associated with the republican vision.
A.

Collective Preferences; Voluntary Foreclosure
of Consumption Choices

Societies have collective preferences, and people have "preferences about preferences." People may seek environmental laws even
though they do not visit the national parks; they may want government to support public broadcasting even though they do not watch
public broadcasting; they may favor welfare programs even though
they do not give to the poor. In these and other cases, people may,
through government, implement their preferences about preferences.
This phenomenon-voluntary foreclosure of consumption choices-is
the political analogue of the story of Ulysses and the Sirens.'
The notion of "preferences about preferences" fits comfortably
with the republican conception of politics. The phenomenon reveals
that in their capacity as citizens, people make decisions that diverge
from those they make as consumers. Voluntary foreclosure of choice
is a pure example of conscious selection of preferences. It also is quite
different from ordinary paternalism, or from a system in which majorities are seeking to impose their will on minorities simply because
they disapprove of the conduct in question. The majority is seeking to
6. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-87 (1972);
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (R. Horwitz ed. 1979).
7. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
8. See J. ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (2d ed. 1984).
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bind itself, and the legal system is the best way to accomplish this
task.
The vindication of "preferences about preferences" through politics should not always be approved. Some such preferences are independently objectionable; consider a preference not to marry someone
of another race manifesting itself in a miscegenation law. In general,
however, the voluntary foreclosure of consumption choices is unobjectionable, and the phenomenon suggests a serious defect in agency
theories of government and in models of political behavior that treat
political choices as consumption choices.
B.

Preferences and Legal Rules

Preferences are heavily influenced by context, including one's
position in the social order. That position is in turn influenced by
legal rules. This phenomenon generates a serious problem for theories
that take preferences as exogenous variables. When preferences are
traceable to a legal rule or an existing legal regime, the rules and the
regime cannot be justified, without circularity, by reference to the
preferences. This conclusion has important implications for the
assumption, embodied in Takings and economic approaches to law
generally, that the role of law is to facilitate the satisfaction of private
preferences. If the law generates the preferences, that assumption
verges on the incoherent. Moreover, defects in the rules that produce
preferences may produce preferences that are defective. There may be
a good case for collective action to change the existing legal rules.
There are several related examples here: the phenomenon of "adaptive preferences"; "endowment effects," which are preferences attributable to ownership or nonownership; and "ideology," amounting to
interest-induced beliefs on the part of the well-off and adaptive preferences on the part of those who are badly-off.
The phenomenon of adaptive preferences occurs when preferences are a product of the absence of available opportunities. People
may reject an opportunity because they consider it to be unavailable.
This is, as Jon Elster has argued, a powerful attack on some forms of
utilitarian thought: "For the utilitarian, there would be no welfare
loss if the fox were excluded from consumption of grapes, since he
thought them sour anyway. But of course the cause of his holding
them to be sour was his conviction that he would be excluded from
consuming them, and then it is difficult to justify the allocation by
invoking his preferences." 9 People may, in short, try to adjust their
9. J.

ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES

109 (1983).
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preferences to the existing order. Montesquieu, for example, emphasized that one of the most pernicious features of the harem was that
the women came to enjoy their fate;1 ° and some of the newly freed
slaves were ambivalent about their freedom. Rebellion produces cognitive dissonance, and the adjustment to the status quo is an important means of dissonance reduction.
This phenomenon has potentially explosive implications. Above
all, it suggests that the fact that people are content with the status quo
need not be a dispositive argument against changing it. One of the
functions of politics is to expose adaptive preferences as such, and to
subject the existing legal regime to critical scrutiny even if people
have adapted to it. A system that takes private preferences as exogenous-such as Epstein's-will omit this central function of politics.
Closely related problems occur when there are "endowment
effects," or preferences attributable to ownership or nonownership.
Sometimes people value things they own more than the same things
when they are in the hands of others. This effect has complex roots, 1
but it suggests that it is far too simple to say that because people do
not want something, it is not in their interest to give it to them. Some
entitlements may have great value once they are conferred on people,
even if the same people do not seem eager to have those entitlements
in the first place. This problem is related to that of "ideology"structures of belief and preference that are determined by one's position in the social order.1 2 One of the roles of politics may be to reveal
ideology as such.
These considerations suggest that preferences are not and should
not be treated as exogenous variables. Approaches to the legal system
like that in Takings do not admit inquiries into processes of preference formation, thus leaving out an important descriptive and evaluative tool.
C.

Endogenous Preferences: Addiction and Others

Sometimes preferences are endogenous to the very act of consumption. This is the classic argument for regulating addictive substances. Here the problem is that an addict might continue
(rationally) to consume notwithstanding the fact that he would have
preferred not to have become involved with the object of his addiction
in the first place. The case for intervention stems from the fact that
10. Montesquieu, Letter XXVI Usbek to Roxana, at the Seraglioat Ispahan, in PERSIAN
AND CHINESE LETTERS 69 (J. Davidson trans. 1901) (1721).
11. For a discussion, see Sunstein, supra note *.
12. See J. ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX (1985).
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preferences are not static, but can be changed through legal requirements, and changed in such a way as to generate gains in terms of
welfare and autonomy. Private preferences suffer from what might be
called an intrapersonal collective action problem, in which the shortterm costs of engaging in or stopping an activity are overvalued in
comparison with the long-term gains. The goal of regulation is to
ensure that the preference does not become formed in the first place.
An addiction is the most intense and obvious case, but it is an example of a pervasive phenomenon. Consider habits and myopic behavior, both of which may be understood as cases in which the short-term
costs of change are (wrongly) seen to dwarf the long-term benefits.
The phenomenon of endogenous preferences helps to explain a
wide range of legal rules. The endogenous character of the resistance
to seatbelt use might justify legal requirements that people buckle
seatbelts in automobiles. It may be that once people are in the habit
of buckling their belts, the subjective costs of buckling will decrease
dramatically. If so, the fact that people currently fail to buckle need
not be dispositive.
Legal rules that combat addictions, habits, and myopia are hard
to square with some of the assumptions in Takings. But the endogenous character of preferences will sometimes justify legal changes in
the face of current practices.
D. Cognitive Distortions and Low-probability Events
Sometimes people do not have the information on which to
ground a consumption choice. Mill, for example, argued that it was
no infringement on autonomy to prevent someone from inadvertently
falling off a bridge.13 The provision of information and, in some cases,
the foreclosure of choice based on inadequate information may turn
out to be justifiable on both welfare and autonomy grounds.
Of particular importance here is a problem that is only beginning
to receive attention in legal theory. The problem involves cognitive
distortions that often make people ill-equipped to deal with lowprobability events. People sometimes completely discount the
probability that a dangerous event will occur when the probability of
its occurrence is quite low. Thus, for example, people may treat the
risk that a tornado will occur as if its discounted value were zero.
The phenomenon of irrationally discounting low-probability
events is part of a more general problem. In sorting out probabilities,
people tend to rely on devices that simplify complex problems, devices
13. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (E. Rapaport ed. 1978) (1859).
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that can lead to severe errors. When this phenomenon occurs, there is
a persuasive prima facie case for government intervention to correct
for the cognitive error. Many forms of intervention can be thus
understood. Compulsory seatbelt laws, various safety requirements in
the workplace, and nonwaivable implied terms in contract and tort
law are examples.
E. Summary

We have seen that if some of the premises of Takings are
rejected, it is possible to identify categories of cases in which legal
interference with private preferences is defensible on both welfare and
autonomy grounds. To say this is not to deny the risk of abuse. If
government is free to ignore private preferences, there will be a danger of tyranny. But it is a mistake to conclude, from the prospect of
abuse, that legal systems must take preferences as exogenous in all
contexts. It is possible to identify with some precision the cases in
which private preferences are likely to malfunction, or to be an inappropriate basis for social choice. One might therefore avoid tautologies based on the concept of "revealed preferences" without at the
same time allowing intervention on the ground that consumption
choices invariably are misguided. A system that takes preferences for
granted operates under an unsound conception of freedom, and will
produce less in the way of autonomy and welfare than the alternative.
III.

CONCLUSION

Insofar as it is political theory, Takings is part of a narrow strand
of the liberal tradition, one that takes the existing distribution of
property and the existing set of preferences as natural, rather than
social, and disables government from affecting either. That strand of
liberalism flourished during the Lochner era. A competing species of
liberal thought-reflected in much of modern law-sees the collective
selection of preferences as a natural and desirable feature of government. This species of liberalism is, of course, subject to abuse. Those
abuses can be controlled, however, thus promoting both welfare and
autonomy in ways that are impossible under the approach in Takings.
I have tried to outline here some of the implications of this conception
of politics for legal treatment of private preferences.
Significant dangers lie in an approach that would take property
and preferences for granted. That strand of liberalism was properly
rejected during the New Deal. I conclude that one of the most important tasks for modern legal theory is not to ignore processes of prefer-
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ence formation, but to operate within, and to give content to, this
alternative aspect of the liberal tradition.

